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THE CASE AGAINST THE LINE-ITEM VETO
MICKEY EDWARDS*
I. THE PRESIDENT ASKS FOR NEW VETO AUTHORITY
On January 13, 1984 President Ronald Reagan an-
nounced that he would ask Congress to provide authority by
which a President of the United States might exercise veto
power over individual items contained within appropriations
bills approved by Congress.1 Within the next two months,
fourteen separate bills and joint resolutions were introduced
in Congress to give the President such authority.'
II. A TOOL FOR FISCAL RESTRAINT
The line-item veto, which enables a chief executive to re-
ject bits and pieces of spending bills without vetoing the en-
tire appropriation, is a part of the package of powers exer-
cised by the governors of forty-three of the fifty states.'
Proponents of a Presidential line-item veto argue that be-
cause governors have that power, and because governors
sometimes use it as an effective restraint on state spending,
the same power should be given to the President."
Because the line-item veto would give the President addi-
tional power to restrain federal spending and because any re-
duction in the size of the annual deficits would be welcome, if
the line-item veto's usefulness as a fiscal tool was the only is-
sue involved, there would clearly be a great deal of merit in
the proposal. But there is far more involved. The line-item
veto raises transcendent and fundamental questions about the
very nature of the American Experiment.
* Member, United States House of Representatives (R-Okla.)
1. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1984, at A16, col. 3.
2. These bills include S.1921 S.J. Res. 26, H.R. 470 and H.J. Res.
436. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, PROPOSALS FOR LINE ITEM VETO
AUTHORITY (Legislative Analysis No. 91, 1984).
3. Indiana, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Ver-
mont do not grant their governors line-item veto authority. North Caro-
lina grants no gubernatorial veto power whatsoever. See STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE LINE-ITEM VETO: AN AP-
PRAISAL 16 (Comm. Print Feb. 1984) [hereinafter cited as AN APPRAISAL].
4. Dixon, The Case for the Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 207 (1984).
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III. A THREAT TO THE BALANCE OF POWERS
The two most important principles embodied in the Con-
stitution of the United States are the separation of powers,
and the balance of powers, a system of checks and balances
which ensures that none of the repositories of separated pow-
ers is able to achieve dominance over the others. The foun-
ders of this Republic intended to prevent the concentration
of power in the hands of one or a few men, and the domi-
nance of one branch of government over another. The sepa-
ration of powers, both between the federal government and
states, and between the branches of the federal government,
is critically important to our form of government. But equally
important, for it is the added ingredient that makes the sepa-
ration meaningful, is the balance of powers available to the
various centers of power. It is this balance which would be
destroyed by the granting of significant new powers to the
President.
IV. A PRESIDENTIAL POWER THAT MAY RETURN TO HAUNT
ITS ADVOCATES
Supporters of the line-item veto proposal argue that the
veto would give the President additional power to reduce the
level of federal spending, with the implicit assumption that
the advocates of this new power would be in sympathy with
the reductions thus made.
It is true that a President could use the line-item veto to
hold down spending by marshalling the support of one-third
of the members of Congress for a single spending reduction
when he might not be able to get the same level of support if
he were to veto an entire appropriation. 5 President Carter
learned that this was true when he attempted, in his first year
in office, to veto a congressional appropriation for various
water projects.6 Had he been able to veto only one or two of
those projects, he might have received enough support in the
Congress to sustain his veto. But because he had to veto the
entire bill he was soundly defeated on the House floor.
Many conservatives express joy at the prospect of being
5. The President would need the support of two-thirds of the Con-
gress to veto an entire appropriation since Congress can override a Presi-
dential veto by a vote of two-thirds of its members. See U.S. Const. art. I,
§7 cl. 2.
6. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. (1982)).
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able to strike individual projects with the assistance of a sym-
pathetic President. But powers created for the use of one
President will remain to be used by others. When the Articles
of Confederation were replaced by a new Constitution, which
increased the power inherent in the Chief Executive," those
who feared new concentrations of power found comfort in
their awareness that George Washington was certain to be-
come President and was unlikely to abuse such powers.8 But
of course, George Washington did not remain President
forever.
Conservatives, who are among the principal advocates of
granting line-item veto authority to the President, should re-
member that at some point in the future a non-conservative
President would be able to use the same power to strike
projects those conservatives might choose to support.
If the 1984 Democratic presidential candidate had been
elected, for example, he would certainly have stricken the
MX missile and the B-i bomber from the defense appropria-
tion, and would just as certainly have stricken military assis-
tance to the government of El Salvador from the foreign as-
sistance appropriation. In short, power given to a liberal
President will remain to be used by a conservative President,
and power given to a conservative President will remain to be
used by a liberal President.
In addition, proponents of the presidental line-item veto
overstate the good that could be done by even the most dili-
gent President armed with such impressive new powers.
Much of the federal budget, including some 100 entitlement
programs which account for nearly 50 percent of all federal
spending,9 and the interest payments on the national debt,
which account for approximately 12 percent of federal
spending, 10 falls outside the scope of the appropriation pro-
cess." Most federal spending would not be affected in any
way by the use of a line-item veto of congressional appropria-
tions. According to Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon, the
chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, "the
7. See THE FEDERALIST No. 40 (. Madison).
8. A. Schlesinger,,THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 2 (1973); See THE FED-
ERALIST No. 68 (A. Hamilton).
9. See Line Item Veto: Hearings on S.J. Res. 26, S.J. Res. 178 and S.
1921 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 24-25 (1984) (statement of Senator Mark Hatfield)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
10. See id. at 24-25.
11. See AN APPRAISAL, supra note 3, at 16.
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President could veto each line-item in every appropriations
bill and still end up with a deficit of well over $100 billion
per year."
12
At best, assuming maximum use of the veto power, i.e.
that the President were to veto every single item of appropri-
ation and, in the process, wipe out the FBI, Border Patrol,
Legal Services Corporation, Public Broadcasting Corpora-
tion, and every other federal non-entitlement program, we
would still have a massive federal deficit and a rapidly grow-
ing cumulative debt. To embrace such an awesome shift of
power to the Presidency, one must ask whether the benefits
are worth the risk. The sizable amount of federal spending
left untouched makes such a proposition doubtful.
V. THE PROPER SOLUTION IS POLITICAL, NOT
CONSTITUTIONAL
But it is not merely those pragmatic considerations which
should be emphasized. Some conservatives see only that a
line-item veto, if passed, would give Ronald Reagan a tool
whereby he might increase his leverage on the spending pro-
cess during his second term. That is, in my opinion, a danger-
ously cavalier attitude toward a change in the law which
would seriously alter the basic structure of our federal gov-
ernment and increase the potential danger to our freedoms.
So the obvious question is whether the granting of more
power to the President is the only means of dealing with the
problem. It is not. The proper solution is not constitutional,
but political. Some historians rightly tell us that the answer to
such questions lies in the political process - that is, democ-
racy depends on persuasion and consent.
The term of office for a United States Representative is
limited to two years so the voters will have available to them
a ready political solution if they are dissatisfied with their
representative's performance." It takes great effort and a
great expenditure of time and money and personal involve-
ment to bring about change through the political process, but
that is the system provided for in the Constitution. The ma-
jor directional change which followed the election of Presi-
dent Reagan and additional Republican Representatives and
Senators in 1980, and the subsequent modification in that di-
rectional change which followed the national elections of
12. Hearings, supra note 13, at 25.
13. See THE FEDERAIST Nos. 52-53 (J. Madison).
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1982, are clear proof that the system does work.
VI. LIMITING THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER
The American Constitution was drafted the way it was
for a very good reason. Looking about us at the Soviet
Union, at Poland, at Cuba, at Guatemala, at Iran, at China,
we see very clearly that even today in many countries power
remains concentrated in a few hands, and that in varying de-
grees individual freedoms have been constrained. The men
who founded this country did not grow up in twentieth cen-
tury America, with its understandable tendency to take its
freedoms for granted. They had themselves experienced the
diminutions of individual volition - the almost inevitable
loss of freedom - in societies in which power was narrowly
concentrated. They entered the framing of our constitutional
system with a sharp awareness that concentration of power
may lead to a reduction of citizen freedoms, 4 and that citizen
freedoms cannot be diminished absent concentration of state
power in a few hands.
It has been argued that the body of men who were at the
forefront in creating this new republic were as brilliant in
statecraft as any group of men ever assembled. It is interest-
ing, therefore, that the first system they devised, based on the
Articles of Confederation, restricted the powers of the execu-
tive branch far more than they are restricted by the Constitu-
tion15 and far more than the system we live under today,
which has broadly stretched the Constitution to accommo-
date an ever-stronger chief executive."6
When it was determined that the Articles of Confedera-
tion were too restrictive of executive powers to be workable
in a modern state, the Articles were scrapped and the Consti-
tution drafted to take its place." The Constitution which
now governs our political system-, with its balancing of pow-
ers, its separation of powers, and its strict restrictions on fed-
eral and executive power, is a revised system which the na-
tion's founders drafted to set the outer limits of acceptable
concentrations of power.
Since the drafting of the Constitution, however, there
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
15. In fact, not even so much as an executive commission was estab-
lished by the Articles of Confederation. Ross & Schwengel, An Item Veto for
the President?, 12 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 66, 67 (1982).
16. Id. at 67.
17. See THE FEDERALIST, No 16 (A. Hamilton).
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has been a significant increase in the de facto powers of the
executive branch. It is that shift, and the dangers its exten-
sion might pose, rather than the size of the federal budget,
which is the real issue at stake in consideration of the pro-
posed line-item veto.
There are those who argue that it is the Congress which
has infringed upon Presidential prerogatives by the use of
non-germane amendments known as "riders," overly broad
appropriations bills and "continuing resolutions,"18 which
lump together many of the spending bills for the federal gov-
ernment and thus make it virtually impossible for a President
to exercise his veto over items he has the right under the
Constitution to accept or reject. 9
Those arguments are simply not valid: In the first place,
riders are simply amendments: they do not fall from the sky,
but are added to appropriations bills by a vote of the Con-
gress. If a rider is added in one house of Congress, the other
must concur before it can become law. Nothing is contained
in any bill passed by Congress except with the consent of the
majority of its members. The entire legislative authority of
the federal government is vested by the Constitution in the
Congress.2 Thus, decisions to amend bills in this way are de-
cisions which the Congress has the right to make.
Aside from the fact that "continuing resolutions," by
their scope and their "Christmas-tree" nature, invite Presi-
dential vetoes more than they discourage them, it is essential
to remember that the right the founding fathers sought to
protect was the right of Congress to determine policy, not
the right of the President to challenge it.2
A recent American Enterprise Institute study empha-
sized that the founding fathers did not intend to authorize a
presidential line-item veto: "Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 concluded only reluc-
tantly that the executive should possess a limited veto author-
ity . . . . the President was limited to approval or rejection
of a bill in its entirety, and the Congress could override a
Presidential veto . . . . these two limitations on the veto
power were part of the 'original understanding that the veto
18. See AN APPRAISAL, supra note 3, at 17; see also Zinn, The Veto
Power of the President, 12 F.R.D. 207, 238-41 (1952); Givens, The Validity of
a Separate Veto of Nongermane Riders to Legislation, 39 TEMPLE L.Q 60
(1965).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, §1.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl. 2; §9, ci. 7.
21. See A. Schlesinger, supra, note 8, at 2-3.
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would be used only rarely, and certainly not as a means of
systematic policy control over the legislative branch . . .' the
question of giving the executive the power to veto only por-
tions of a bill . . . was not discussed . "...22
Thus, Presidents were meant to have only limited influ-
ence over legislation, primarily to protect against Congres-
sional infringement on the independence of the Chief Execu-
tive. All legislative power is given by the Constitution to the
Congress, whether exercised through bills, germane amend-
ments, riders, continuing resolutions or any other means. In
fact, prohibitions, sometimes ignored, against legislating in
an appropriations bill are merely part of the myriad of rules
which the Congres has imposed upon itself in choosing inde-
pendently how to best exercise the power that properly be-
longs to it.23
Rather than the increase in the level of federal spending,
the real issue here is the expansion of the powers of the pres-
idency. Before we agree to such a change we should be cer-
tain that we are willing to accept its consequences.
VII. THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
What would be the effect of giving to the President the
additional power of the line-item veto? Under the current
system, a majority of the members of Congress may deter-
mine the' spending priorities for the nation;2 4 that is, the ma-
jority of the members of Congress may determine, at least on
all domestic issues, what national policy shall be, since the
power to appropriate is effective control over policy.
That is how the nation's founders wanted it. They gave
the President great powers in foreign policy and military af-
fairs,2 ' and gave him the veto power to give him a limited
voice in other matters as well. 6 But the setting of the na-
tional priorities was to be left in the hands of a Congress of
men and women directly representative of the people.
Not only was the initiative in the appropriation of money
to be left to the legislative branch, it was also specifically dele-
gated to the House of Representatives, that legislative branch
of government in which power is the least concentrated. It is
22. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, PROPOSALS FOR LINE ITEM
VETO AUTHORITY (Legislative Analysis No. 91, 1984).
23. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 99 S. Ct. 2335, 2340-43 (1979).
24. U.S. Const. art. I, §8.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, §7.
26. Id.
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the branch in which power is shared by the largest number of
people, 435, and in which the interests which influence those
powers are the most diffuse. Each member of the House of
Representatives is concerned primarily with the interests and
forces within a single one of 435 districts. Legislation is ac-
cepted only when those men and women who represent a ma-
jority of the congressional districts in the United States, and
therefore a majority of the population of the United States,
conclude that a majority of the people they represent would
desire such legislation.
This diffusion of power is in sharp contrast with the ex-
ecutive branch, in which ultimate power resides in a single
individual, in which secondary and derivative power is di-
vided among some half a dozen, or fewer, principal assistants,
and in which tertiary power is divided among another twenty
or so persons who form the cabinet. The executive branch is
a very large pyramid, but its peak is very narrow, and power
resides ultimately in the hands of a single individual.
It is my premise - and I believe it was the premise of
the founders of the Republic - that the concentration of
power in a few hands is the single greatest threat to individ-
ual liberty. Concentration of power is not inherently evil, but
it makes the perpetration of evil much easier.
VIII. TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE PRESIDENT
Having concluded that the concentration of power is to
be avoided, and having also asserted that the power to con-
trol appropriations is the power to determine policy, let me
suggest that the adoption of the line-item veto as a tool in the
hands of the Chief Executive effectively transfers control of
federal policy from the Congress to the President. It is simply
a matter of arithmetic. Under the current system, if 218
members of the House and 51 members of the Senate are in
accord on the matter of any policy, forming a Legal Services
Corporation, for example, or establishing a Food Stamp Pro-
gram, or agreeing to build and deploy the B-i bomber, then
that will be the law.21 The President may choose to exercise
his veto, but by a vote of two-thirds of its members, the Con-
gress may reaffirm its previous decision.28 Given the general
nature of appropriations legislation - all defense spending is
27. 218 and 51 members constitute majorities of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the-Senate respectively.
28. U.S. Const. art. I, §7.
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incorporated in a single bill, for example, and all programs
for the Department of Health and Human Services are con-
tained in another single bill - and because each program
has its own constituency, it is frequently possible to accumu-
late enough votes in the Congress to override a Presidential
veto.2 9
But if the President is given the power of the line-item
veto, the initiative on spending will move to the President,
because the Congress will need to come up with the two-
thirds vote of each House required to override a veto in or-
der to ensure that any of these programs will become law.30
Instead of the Congress making law by majority vote, it will
now be required to come up with a two-thirds vote of each
House, and the President would need only to gather the sup-
port of one-third of the members of one House of Congress
to permit him to set the legislative agenda. For example, the
President, with the assistance of one-third of one House of
the Congress, could kill the B-i bomber or food stamps. To-
day, if 65 percent of the Congress favors an individual pro-
gram within an appropriation bill, it will become law. With
the line-item veto, if all the members of one House and 65
percent of the other House favored a program, but the Presi-
dent did not, it would not become law. The President would
simply take over the role of the Congress. A small minority
of the Congress, with the aid of a sympathetic President,
would become a majority on every single spending decision,
and, thus, every single priority decision currently vested by
the Constitution in the majority of Congress. While it is true
that some proposals would require only a majority vote to
override a presidential line-item veto, most of the bills and
resolutions call for a two-thirds majority.
Instead of the Congress calling the legislative shots, with
the President only occasionally being able to veto something,
the President will be calling the shots. That is the opposite of
what the founding fathers clearly intended. A veto is, by defi-
nition, a negative action, a device to stop something. It was
never intended that the President, who is given by the Con-
stitution only this one legislative weapon, should in fact de-
29. See J. Palffy, Line-Item Veto: Trimming the Pork, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER No. 343, April 3, 1984, at 6-7.
30. Some line-item veto proposals would require only a majority vote
to override a presidential veto, but twelve of the fourteen bills and resolu-
tions introduced as of March, 1984 call for a two-thirds majority override.
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termine national legislative policy."
The President, one man, is Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces,32 dominates foreign policy, and needs only a
bare majority of the members present and voting in the
smallest house of Congress to appoint the members of the
Supreme Court, all of the Cabinet and the heads of all fed-
eral agencies.33 To give him effective control over all domes-
tic programs and all federal spending as well, is to effectively
change our entire system of government and to grant to the
Chief Executive considerably more power than the awesome
power which he possesses today.
While the line-item veto is one weapon which could be
brought to bear on, current budget problems, the disadvan-
tages it presents are so far-reaching and so traumatic to our
system of government that its price is simply too high to pay.
In this regard, William Howard Taft, who served both as
President and as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,"
warned of the potential danger of the line-item veto. "It is
better to trust to the action of the people (through the politi-
cal process)," he said, "than to give, in such a powerful in-
strument (the line-item veto) . . . a temptation to its sinister
use."
35
One such potential "sinister use" has been suggested by
former Congressman Elliott Levitas of Georgia, who points
out that a President could use the power of the line-item veto
to force a member of Congress to support a Presidential pro-
gram for fear of losing a project or legislation important to
the Congressman's constituents. A President could say, for
example, to Congressman A, that if the Congressman does
not support the President's position on the sale of the
AWACS airplane to Saudi Arabia, or a reduction in the fund-
ing for food stamps, or cancellation of the Clinch River reac-
tor project, the President will strike from the next transpor-
tation appropriation the money for a highway in
Congressman A's district. Today the Administration can
withdraw its support from a project, but a majority of the
31. U.S. CONST., art II, §2, cl. 1.
32. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, §2, cl. 2
33. Taft (1857-1930) was president from 1909 to 1913 and Chief
Justice during the years 1921 through 1930.
34. W. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS 27 (1925); see
also W. TAFT, THE PRESIDENCY, ITS DUTIES, ITS POWERS, ITS OPPORTUNITIES
AND ITS LIMITATIONS 20 (1916).
35. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EMPOW-
ERING ITEM VETO BY LEGISLATION (CRS Study, Jan. 4, 1984).
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Congress may decide to support it anyway." With the line-
item veto, Congressman A would have to win the support of
two-thirds of his colleagues and the President would, in fact,
be able to deliver on his threat.3 7 We would have regressed
from a system of Presidential arm-twisting - "strong" per-
suasion - to a system of blackmail.
It is not accurate, incidentally, to suggest that all high-
ways are simply wasteful "pork barrel" projects; it is the con-
stitutional responsibility of the federal government to build
roads and highways, and each will have to be built in some
Congressman's district. If Congressman A's constituents need
a new road or highway repairs for safety or commerce, the
project should not depend on the Congressman's willingness
to surrender his obligation to deliberate on matters of na-
tional policy.
IX. STATES ARE NOT SMALL FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
What about the argument that this concentration of
power does, in fact, exist today in a number of states in which
governors maintain line-item veto authority?
In some states, chief executives have used this power to
help restrain spending by the legislative branch. That fact
is, however, irrelevant to a discussion of the merits of estab-
lishing a presidential line-item veto. It suggests that state gov-
ernments are like the federal government, only smaller.
While the comparison is a handy tool for teaching govern-
mental theory, in truth there is no valid parallel. Only the
federal government has the power to affect our relationships
with our allies or the Soviet Union. Only the federal gov-
ernment is responsible for maintaining the capacity to defend
the country, and only the federal government can involve us
in war.40 Only the federal government is responsible for
maintaining the capability to alert us to dangers from foreign
powers.41 Only the federal government deals with questions
of life or death for the nation as a whole.
Powers may be concentrated in the hands of a governor
of a state, even a large state, such as California or New York,
36. S.J. Res. 128, 129 Cong. Rec. S13591 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1983); See
U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, ci. 7.
37. See AN APPRAISAL, supra note 3, at 13-14.
38. Id. at 17.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3; §10, cl. 3.
40. Id. See also art. I, §7 cl. 11-15.
41. Id.
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but the federal government's potential for causing benefit or
harm is immensely greater, and the concentration of powers
at the federal level is therefore immensely more dangerous.
X. A PATTERN OF SHIFTING POWER
I do not suggest that the line-item veto is such a power
that in itself it will transform the presidency from benign to
malignant. But so many other powers have been shifted from
the legislative to the executive branch, including the enor-
mous delegations of power to executive branch agencies and
the surrender to the presidency of the power to initiate the
setting of the budget, that the line-item veto cannot be
looked at as a single legislative proposal. It must be viewed as
another step in a series of changes which has led to the ac-
crual of significant new powers in the presidency.
Despite the clear separation of powers implied in the
Constitution, there has been a de facto overlapping of re-
sponsibilities and potential for initiative. To a large extent
the powers of the presidency have depended on the persua-
sive powers and aggressive or passive nature of the President.
The availability of new means of mass communication has
greatly magnified the persuasive authority of activist Presi-
dents without any malicious attempts by the occupants of the
White House to usurp powers otherwise reserved to other
branches of the government.
Other factors, too, have increased the weight of presi-
dential authority. The Supreme Court, in striking down the
congressional power of legislative veto,4 has permitted a
much freer rein to executive branch agencies. While the line-
item veto would shift control of policy from the legislative
branch to the executive branch, the loss of the legislative
veto removes any effective control by the Congress over the
actions of Presidential appointees. Without the legislative
veto, Congress has lost part of its power to control the imple-
mentation of its policies. With a line-item veto the Congress
would lose even the power to determine policy.
The Congress itself is responsible for some of the ac-
cumulation of presidential powers, both through almost un-
restricted delegation to executive branch agencies, and
through legislation which has specifically transferred respon-
sibility to the Chief Executive. The Budget and Accounting
42. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764
(1983).
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Act of 1921, for example, required for the first time, that the
President prepare a proposed budget."3
To a very large extent, the President's party in the Con-
gress has been reduced to an extension of the White House,
laboring under an assumed obligation to enact the Presi-
dent's legislative proposals. It is not unusual to hear members
of Congress talk of casting votes for programs they would
otherwise oppose because the programs are a part of the leg-
islative agenda of "their" President. Presidents today fre-
quently determine the agenda for congressional debate and
presidential assistants actively lobby members of Congress,
stand in the halls outside the voting chambers to signal what
vote the President wants, participate actively in committee
deliberations, prepare proposed legislation, and even partici-
pate in meetings of the leadership of the President's party in
the House and Senate.
XI. DEBATING THE REAL ISSUE
Finally, I contend that because the line-item veto effec-
tively transfers control over federal spending, and therefore
over domestic policy setting, from the Congress to the Presi-
dent, it would greatly narrow the separation of powers and
sharply disturb the balance of powers.
That being the case, I would argue that valid political
deliberation requires that the question be debated not on the
narrower basis of whether a line-item veto would provide ad-
ditional controls over federal spending, but in a far broader
context, whether we shall restructure the federal government
and change the balance of powers in order to give the Presi-
dent - not this President, but any President - greater
power and to decrease the power of our directly elected rep-
resentatives to determine the national priorities. That is a far
more accurate description of the question.
I do not contend that the answer to that question is self-
evident. Many people would argue, as I do, that the concen-
tration of power is an enormous threat to civil liberties.
Others would probably argue that the protection of civil lib-
erties is less important than creating the potential for greater
fiscal restraint. But those are the arguments that ought to be
weighed in this debate. James Madison and Alexander Hamil-
ton made clear in the Federalist Papers that in a republic
43. 31 U.S.C. §11 (Originally enacted as Act of June 10, 1921, ch.
18, tit. II, §201(a), 42 Stat. 20).
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such as ours, it is the Congress which is to be the predomi-
nant branch of government. It is, in my opinion, a dangerous
thing for a nation to ponder significant changes in its govern-
mental system without addressing the basic and fundamental
questions and the ramifications of the various options.
Control of the spending process should remain with the
branch of government most directly responsive to the public
and most consistent with the balancing of powers envisioned
by the authors of the Constitution.
Fiscal conservatives, including a large and growing per-
centage of the American public, are understandably frus-
trated by the growing federal deficit and the failure of the
Congress to act decisively to bring federal spending under
control. But the failures of the Congress to act as those fiscal
conservatives desire does not prove that the Congress is unre-
sponsive; it proves the opposite. There remains a great con-
stituency for additional public spending. Many of those who
are most concerned and most conservative want spending to
be reduced in a great many portions of the public domain but
increased in a selected few of their own preference. The
Congress is giving the people the government which most
Americans want. I therefore suggest that the solution to the
problem is political. Rather than radically restructuring the
federal government, we must persuade enough of the people
to vote for candidates committed to a reduced federal role.
Admittedly, the political solution will take hard work,
and it will take time. When frustration is great, it is tempting
to look for shortcuts. But James Madison warned that "[t]he
accumulation of all powers . . . in the same hands . . .
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."44 Increasing the
powers of a single man, creating a "national leader" with
dominance over all aspects of the federal government, will
create an imperial presidency and threaten the very founda-
tion of our government.
It would be tragic if we were to heedlessly, and in the
name of short-term expediency, begin to dismantle those sep-
arations and balancings of power which are our greatest pro-
tection against the potential dangers inherent in the concen-
tration of power in too few hands.
Such a major change in our basic form of government
should not be dealt with in a cavalier manner, nor be too
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison).
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quickly embraced as a convenient solution to contemporary
frustration.

